




Centro di Analisi delle Politiche Pubbliche 
 
Estimation and Simulation of 
Earnings in IT-SILC 
 
Emanuele Ciani, Marcello Morciano 
 





COMMUNITY PROGRAMME FOR EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 
(PROGRESS) 
Action related to the development of administrative datasets and models  
for labour market and pensions analysis 
 
Project ASSESSING ADEQUACY AND LONG TERM DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF THE 
ITALIAN PENSION SYSTEM.  
A MICROSIMULATION APPROACH VS/2009/0498 
 
 
This  publication  is  supported  under  the  European  Community  Programme  for  Employment  and  Social 
Solidarity – PROGRESS (2007-2013). 
 
This  programme  is  managed  by  the  Directorate-General  for  Employment,  social  affairs  and  equal 
opportunities of the European Commission. It was established to financially support the implementation of 
the objectives of the European Union in the employment and social affairs area, as set out in the Social 
Agenda, and thereby contribute to the achievement of the Lisbon Strategy goals in these fields. 
 
The seven years Programme targets all stakeholders who can help shape the development of appropriate and 
effective employment and social legislation and policies across the EU-27, EFTA- EEA and EU candidate 
and pre-candidate countries. 
 
PROGRESS  mission  is  to  strengthen  the  EU  contribution  in  support  of  Member  States  commitment. 
PROGRESS will be instrumental in: 
 
  providing analysis and policy advice on PROGRESS policy areas; 
  monitoring and reporting on the implementation of EU legislation and policies in PROGRESS policy 
areas; 
  promoting  policy  transfer,  learning  and  support  among  Member  States  on  EU  objectives  and 
priorities; and 
  relaying the views of the stakeholders and society at large 
 




The information contained in this publications  
does not necessarily reflect the position or opinion  
of the European Commission 1 | P a g e  
 
 
Estimation and Simulation of Earnings in IT-SILC 
Emanuele Ciani and Marcello Morciano  
This version 07/09/2011 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper describes income distribution among workers in Italy using both 
the cross-sectional and panel component of IT-SILC. We highlight advantages and drawbacks of 
different econometric approaches, comparing standard OLS estimates with those obtained from 
Random Effects and Poisson Maximum Likelihood and assessing whether the results are sensitive 
to the different specification. Finally, we present the procedure in use in simulating future earnings 
in CAPP_DYN, the dynamic population-based microsimulation model of the CAPP.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the key components of a Dynamic Microsimulation Model (DMM) which focuses on 
the projection and analysis of the reformed Italian old-age pension system is the prediction of the 
individual labour market participation and earnings. This chapter focuses on the latter, while the 
module  which  simulates  the  individual  position  in  regards  to  the  labour  market  was  already 
discussed in Flisi and Morciano (2011).  
Ideally, we would like to use panel-data in order to estimate a model for mean earnings, 
conditional on a set of observable time-variant and time-invariant individual characteristics, and 
modelling the autoregressive component of the residuals. Then, by using the estimated parameters 
we could predict the evolution of an individual’s earnings in future years, taking into account the 
likely evolution of her/his observable characteristics and making assumptions on the evolution of 
unobserved  individual  effect  and  how  the  expected  increases  in  productivity  in  each  of  the 
simulated  periods  would  be  distributed  among  workers.  In  reality,  limited  long  and  up-to-date 
longitudinal data are available for Italy, which creates difficulties in estimating a satisfying and 
credible model for the error component of a wage-equation.
1 As a consequence, and in common 
with other DMMs, we focus here on cross-section estimates, but we also discuss how to make the 
earning module flexible enough to use information on the autocorrelation of earnings across time 
coming from other data studies/sources. 
In this chapter, after descr ibing income distribution among Italian workers, we report 
estimates of parsimonious models of earnings, aiming to be suitable for predictions in the DMM. 
We propose different econometric methods, applied on both the cross -sectional and longitudinal 
component of IT-SILC, paying particular attention to the assumptions regarding the unobservable 
heterogeneity. We also compare standard OLS estimates with those obtained from Random Effects 
and Poisson Maximum Likelihood, in order to assess whether the results a re sensitive to the 
different  specification.
2  To  our  knowledge,  this  is  the  first  empirical  analysis  on  earnings 
distribution using the Italian component of SILC. IT -SILC data on income have gone through a 
process of integration with the administrative archive, based on a one-to-one matching (see Ciani et 
al., 2011).  This allow us to exploit the advantage of using (Italian) administrative archives which, 
nevertheless, have more precise information on income and— at the same time— to make use of a 
set of detailed socio-economic information (collected in  IT-SILC) without employing statistical 
matching techniques.  
                                                 
1 Moreover, it should be pointed out that in some cases, such as the Belgian MIDAS model (Dekkers, Desmet, & De 
Vil, 2010), the random effects panel data regression estimates resulted in very poor DMM simulation results, even 
though the regression results were by themselves credible. 
2  Estimates of a Poisson Maximum Likelihood model are given in the appendix whereas estimates of quintile 
regressions are available upon request.  3 | P a g e  
 
The  chapter  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  a  non-exhaustive  synthesis  of 
previous literature, highlighting advantages and drawbacks of the different approaches. Section 3 
describes earnings distribution in Italy using IT-SILC data. Section 4 discusses OLS estimates, 
while Section 5 is focussed on longitudinal Random Effects results. Section 5 describes the method 
used in CAPP_DYN to simulate earnings in future years. The final section concludes.  
 
2. Background 
From the seminal contributions of Mincer (1974), a multitude of econometric models has 
been proposed to  estimate earnings  and the determinant  of earnings.
3 While one stream of the 
literature aims at estimating the returns on schooling, here we are more interested in those studies 
focussed  on  forecasting  earnings  in  a  populatio n-based  DMM,  such  as  Pudney  (1992)  and 
Bækgaard, King, & Robinson   (1999),  and on modelling the error component in longitudinal 
estimates, like Lillard & Willis (1978), Borella (2004) and Ramos (2003). 
Generally, DMM are based on estimates of a model for lo g-earnings. Some DMM, such as 
the French DESTINIE, MIDAS  (Dekkers, Desmet, & De Vil, 2010) , the model for the Italian 
Tuscany region MIRTODIN (Maitino & Sciclone, 2009) and so on, make projections of individual 
earnings using essentially estimates obtained from cross-sectional data. Basically, the logarithm of 
annual, monthly or weekly earnings is regressed on a set of personal characteristics regarding, in 
particular,  education,  employment  history  and  activity.  In  order  to  allow  more  flexibility, 
regressions are carried out separately on different groups of the population of workers. Estimates 
are then used to predict earnings in two directions. First, these DMMs need to build the earnings 
history for each individual up to the year of the survey, as the cross-sections clearly do not include a 
full record of previous employment.
 4 Secondly, estimates are used to forecast earnings for future 
years, both for those who will still be working and for the individuals who will start a new job.  
The main problem in using cross-sectional data is that differences across age groups, if 
observed at a single point in time, cannot be interpreted as cohort or time effects. Essentially, all 
                                                 
3 Among others, see Spence (1973), Becker (1994), Weiss (1995). 
4 Harding (2007)  wrote ―Where longitudinal earnings histories are not available, modellers have faced enormous 
challenges in attempting to ‘back-cast’ to simulate earnings (and other characteristics) earlier in life.”. According to 
O’Donoghue (2001), base data used by DMM can be divided into historical and current data. A number of models 
(CORSIM, DYNAMOD and DYNACAN) use historic data such as (a random sample of) census files from the 1960’s. 
These models start their simulation at a point in the past, building up a sufficiently long work-history to the present day. 
The reason for this is that in order to simulate pensions, one needs information about work-histories since the year of 
entry  in  the  labour  market.  Some  models,  such  as  MOSART  or  PENSIM,  have  base  data  sets  that  include  work 
histories, so the early start date is not necessary. Other models use data fusion techniques (i.e. statistical matching 
procedures) for matching base year with other data sources containing more detailed retrospective information. Finally, 
other models (DESTINIE and CAPP_DYN) simulate both forwards as other models do, but also backwards to create 
work histories. Although statistical matching provides greater flexibility (Cohen, 1991) it might raise problems in the 
Conditional Independence Assumption (Ridder & Moffit, 2006). Instead, the backward simulation has the advantage of 
simplicity, albeit retrospective information is constructed using simplified assumptions.  4 | P a g e  
 
DMM models face major methodological problems in attempting to disentangle age, cohort and 
period  effects.  As  pointed  out  by  Lillard  &  Willis  (1978),  the  shape  of  a  cross-sectional  age-
earnings distribution changes over time not only through the cohort and period effect. An important 
role is also played by changes in occupational composition and by changes in labour demand. 
The use of longitudinal data can enable age, cohort and time effects to be disentangled. A 
number of DMM models, such as the British PenSim2 (Emmerson, Reed, & Shephard, 2004), the 
U.S  CORSIM  (Favreault  &  Caldweel,  1998),  the  Australian  Dynamod  (2002)  and  the  Italian 
CeRPSIM  (Borella  &  Coda  Moscarola,  (2006),  (2009)),  use  panel  data  for  the  estimation  of 
earnings. Another important advantage in using a longitudinal sample is the possibility to model the 
autocorrelation in the error component, allowing for more precise predictions about future wages. 
Lillard and Willis (1978), as well as Ramos (2003) and Borella (2004), discuss different models for 
the log-earnings residuals. 
Nevertheless, the use of longitudinal estimates for prediction in a DMM might have some 
drawbacks. As pointed out in Harding (1990), if one uses coefficients estimated on panel data, then 
the cohort effects do not provide us with any information about future cohorts. For the MIDAS 
model, Dekkers, Desmet and Greet De Vil (2010, p. 34) pointed out that random‐ effects models 
resulted in very poor DMM simulations results. 
In our case, the main problem is that the robustness of longitudinal estimates depends on the 
use of long panel data. In Italy, the longitudinal component of IT-SILC is still relatively short to 
provide reliable estimates of earnings autocorrelation. This is also due to the fact that Istat started to 
collect  information  on  gross-earnings  only  as  from  2007,  so  that  previous  waves  cannot  be 
employed for our estimates. Moreover, as discussed in section 5, the panel component does not 
contain all variables needed for the simulation and cannot be directly matched to single cross-
sections.
5 
The longitudinal sample of the other most used survey with data on income, SHIW, is 
relatively long. However, results might be affected by its small size and by the absence of gross 
data. Differently, Borella & Coda Moscarola  (2006)  used administrative panel data from the 
National Social Security Institute (INPS), which cover a long time span (1985-1998). The earnings 
variables in this dataset are those which are currently used to calculate pensions, a clear advantage 
for the simulations. However, this administrative archive does not include individuals who worked 
in the public sector, which is a non -negligible fraction of employees. Moreover, focusing on the 
earnings distribution in the period before 2000, it may misrepresent the current situation (see 
                                                 
5 Istat does not provide an identifier that allows this match, in order to comply with the Silc rules agreed at the European 
level, which were devised to protect respondents’ privacy. 5 | P a g e  
 
Harding’s  critique).  Lastly,  INPS  administrative  archive  does  not  include  any  information  on 
workers’ education, which is an important variable in predicting the earnings distribution in future 
years,  as  we  expect  significant  changes  in  the  proportion  of  graduates  (see  Mazzaferro  and 
Morciano, 2011).  
As  discussed,  the  IT-SILC  panel  is  still  not  suitable  for  our  purpose.  Nonetheless,  we 
decided to base the prediction of earnings on estimates carried out on its cross-sectional component. 
First of all, if we used a different dataset, such as the INPS administrative archive, we would need 
to impute earnings for all individuals, based on a limited set of characteristics that are observable in 
both samples. Differently, using estimates carried out on IT-SILC, we avoid the problems due to 
statistical matching. On the other hand, by employing regression coefficients estimated on the same 
sample we try to avoid the problems related to non-homogeneity between covariates in different 
datasets. Secondly, the method for predicting earnings in future years, described in section 6 and 
built on Pudney (1992), might be modified to use information on the autocorrelation of residuals 
estimated in other studies. Lastly, the SILC longitudinal component is growing at a fast rate, and we 
cannot neglect the benefit of setting up a DMM that can be very easily adapted to use it. 
 
3. Descriptive analysis of gross earnings 
This section discusses descriptive statistics on gross earnings in the sample corresponding to 
the initial population, drawn from IT-SILC 2006 as described in Ciani et al. (2011). We select only 
employed individuals, aged more than 20. The sample is also restricted to those below the legal 
State Pension Age (SPA) in force in 2006, in order to avoid the possible bias due to the substantial 
self-selection of individuals who choose to continue working after the SPA. Where not differently 
stated, all  graphs  and tables reported in  this  chapter  refer to this  sample, composed of 19,720 
observations.
6  
Gross earnings include both employee cash income and cash benefits or losses from self -
employment, plus the social contribution paid by the workers.
7 The measure we are using is the 
earning definition used by the Italian pension system in computing expected pension earnings.  
Table 1 reports sample statistics on the annual gross earnings, in 2006 euro. Self -employed 
have, on average, higher earnings, but they display more dispersion. There are also few negative 
                                                 
6 For reasons discussed in Ciani et al. (2011), we do not use sample weights. However, the use of sample weights makes 
little differences in the results reported in this chapter. 
7 The yearly gross earning is the sum of It -Silc variables py010g (―Employee cash or near cash income‖) and py050g 
(―Cash benefits or losses from self-employment‖), both including the social contribution paid by the worker. For a full 
definition of both variables, we refer to the document ―description of Silc user database variables, Version 2007.1 from 
01-03-09‖. 6 | P a g e  
 
values (44 observations), that we reclassify to be equal to one euro.
8 Among employees, annual 
gross earnings are higher in the public sector.
9 Atypical workers’ earnings are similar to those of 
employees,  even  if  they  generally  show  smaller  medians.  The  mean–median  difference  of  the 
earnings distribution is higher for self-employed. The positive difference between mean and median 
earnings  indicates  that  earnings  are  negatively  skewed,  in  particular  for  self-employed.  We 
therefore focus on the median value for the following distributive analysis. 
 
 
Table 1 Sample statistics on annual gross earnings, by status in employment, euro 2006 
Status in employment 
Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Standard 
Deviation  Observations 
Employee, public sector, full-time  31,664  28,293  650  237,021  18,701  3,867 
Employee, public sector, part-time  15,880  14,098  285  111,412  10,530  296 
Employee, private sector, full-time  24,894  21,131  431  477,897  19,013  9,384 
Employee, private sector, part-time  11,169  9,784  374  100,725  7,416  1,454 
Self-employed, full-time  32,329  22,744  -60,000  641,600  37,167  3,943 
Self-employed, part-time  20,510  12,300  -30,000  268,763  25,487  337 
Atypical, public sector, full-time  23,917  21,772  3,266  87,569  14,931  67 
Atypical, public sector, part-time  14,180  13,828  1,273  28,554  7,702  18 
Atypical, private sector, full-time  23,465  17,652  510  415,160  35,299  234 
Atypical, private sector, part-time  11,311  9,456  1,293  31,799  7,588  63 
Total  26,417  21,753  -60,000  641,600  24,182  19,663 
 
 
Graph 1 displays the medians annual gross earnings by age. The line  relative to men always 
lies above that for women and the variability is larger near the official retirement age. We can 
clearly observe an increasing trend, even though the cross -section analysis might be confounding 
the age effect with the cohort one. A s imilar graph for the mean earnings, not reported, displays the 
same patterns, even if the trend looks more linear.  
Graph 2  reports again the trend of the median earnings with respect to age, but 
disaggregating by level of education. Differences are quite  small for workers aged less than 30, 
while for older individuals we observe an increasing educational premium. One reason for the 
limited differences for young workers might be the self-selection into post-graduate studies.  
 
 
                                                 
8 We reclassify them to one euro in order to allow the logarithm transformation for regression estimates. 
9 Employees in the public sector show higher yearly net earnings also in the 2006 Survey of Households’ Income and 
Wealth (SHIW) carried out by the Bank of Italy. Using SHIW microdata, we do not have gross variables, but we can 
define net earnings by summing variables yl1 (annual net employee earnings, without non-cash employee income) and 
ym (annual net cash and losses from self-employment). Using sampling weights, the mean for employees in the public 
sector is 18,636 euro (s.d. 10,936), while it is 15,314 (s.d. 8,823) for employees in the private sector. Without sampling 
weight, similar results are obtained. 7 | P a g e  
 
Graph 1 Median annual gross earnings, by age and sex, euro 2006 
 
 
 Graph 2 Median annual gross earnings by age and level of education, euro 2006 
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In Graph 3 we can observe that the age-trend is quite similar across different statuses in 
employment, even if the median earnings  are larger  for employees  aged between 50 and 60.
10 
Atypical workers display greater dispersion in their earnings. 
Table 2 shows the presence of individuals with very low annual earnings among those who 
worked for less than 12 months in 2006, which are nearly 8% of the sample. Given that CAPP -
DYN simulates economic and demographic transitions among states in discrete time (annual cycle), 
we should avoid this source of heterogeneity. On the one hand, we should take in to account that 
these workers might have low annual earning levels as a consequence of within -year periods of 
unemployment.
11  On the other hand, we prefer not to exclude them from the analysis, in order to 
introduce further self-selection. 
 
Graph 3 Median annual gross earnings by age and status in employment 
 
A possible solution, apart from the one which requires the simulation of the conditional 
probability of being at work m months and the use of this covariate in the model, is to estimate the 
monthly gross earnings for those months in which these individuals were working.
12  
                                                 
10 In Graph 3 we excluded 541 (2.7%) observations with annual gross earnings higher than 80 thousand euro. 
11 It should be recalled that the way in which we define the economic status allows individuals who worked for two 
months to be workers. See Ciani et al. (2011) for a full discussion. 
12 The number of months worked in 2006 is the sum of variables pl070 and pl072. For 68 observations, corresponding 
to 0.34% of the sample, this sum is equal to zero. These are the persons who were reclassified as workers in the 
construction of the initial population, because their earnings were larger than their income from pensions. The median 9 | P a g e  
 
Table  3  shows  how  this  choice  reduces  the  variability  of  mean  earnings  for  different 
numbers of months in which the individuals worked. The means of both the 1st and 5th quintiles are 
more reasonable with respect to the limited period of one month, as it seems that there less outliers. 
 
Table 2 Annual gross earnings, by months worked, euro 2006 
Months 
worked in 2006  Mean  1st quintile  5th quintile  95th quintile  99th quintile  Per cent 
2  9,122  755  1,273  23,723  67,073  0.6% 
3  6,227  884  1,538  17,506  30,977  0.8% 
4  7,659  732  1,878  23,222  44,499  0.8% 
5  9,961  2,025  2,827  30,782  56,950  0.7% 
6  12,913  1,346  3,554  31,341  117,033  1.0% 
7  11,382  2,439  3,711  23,407  47,321  0.8% 
8  15,738  2,923  4,868  40,043  72,554  0.9% 
9  13,870  685  3,889  31,558  53,874  0.9% 
10  15,778  1,542  3,253  36,565  57,231  1.1% 
11  21,036  3,366  6,054  37,217  84,768  0.6% 
12  27,619  3,526  7,791  62,334  116,998  92.1% 
 
 
Table 3 Monthly gross earnings by months worked, euro 2006 
Months 
worked in 2006  Mean  1st quintile  5th quintile  95th quintile  99th quintile  Per cent 
2  4,561  378  637  11,862  33,536  0.6% 
3  2,076  295  513  5,835  10,326  0.8% 
4  1,915  183  470  5,806  11,125  0.8% 
5  1,992  405  565  6,156  11,390  0.7% 
6  2,152  224  592  5,224  19,506  1.0% 
7  1,626  348  530  3,344  6,760  0.8% 
8  1,967  365  609  5,005  9,069  0.9% 
9  1,541  76  432  3,506  5,986  0.9% 
10  1,578  154  325  3,657  5,723  1.1% 
11  1,912  306  550  3,383  7,706  0.6% 
12  2,302  294  649  5,195  9,750  92.1% 
 
 
4. OLS estimates for monthly gross log-earnings 
In CAPP-DYN we need a statistical model to forecast earnings for workers in future years of 
the simulation. First of all, earnings should change with experience and age. Secondly, we need to 
account  for  heterogeneity  due  to  different  socio-demographic  conditions  and  statuses  in 
employment. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of their annual gross earnings is 38,520, with a minimum of 4,320. For these individuals we set the number of months 
worked to 12, since we removed all monthly pension transfers. 10 | P a g e  
 
As discussed, our prediction is based on cross-sectional estimates. The classical theoretical 
guide is the Mincer earnings function, where the logarithm of earnings y is a linear function of years 
of education t and of experience r, as described by Cahuc & Zylberberg (2004, p. 87)
13 
   (     )                            [     ( )] 
where an individual with t years of schooling and experience r spends a share s(r) of his/her 
time in training. Generally, this last component is omitted in empirical analysis. Theory predicts a 
deterministic relation that, following the literature, we assume to hold on average: 
 (   |   )                         
In order to allow for greater flexibility, instead of using the years of education t as a regressor, we 
decided to estimate different models for sub-groups of the working population, similarly to the 
Australian  Microsimulation  model  NATSEM  (Bækgaard,  2002,  p.  39).  In  particular,  we 
distinguished the seven groups reported in Table 4. We did not split the group of graduated self-
employed by gender in order to maintain a larger number of observations. 
 
Table 4 Groups for regressions 
Group  Observations  Per cent 
Men, not graduated, employees  7,478  38% 
Men, graduated, employees  1,005  5% 
Women, not graduated, employees  5,349  27% 
Women, graduated, employees  1,169  6% 
Graduated, self-employed  911  5% 
Men, not graduated, self-employed  2,627  13% 
Women, not graduated, self-employed  1,124  6% 
Total  19,663  100% 
 
As a proxy for years of experience we use the number of years in which the individual has 
paid social contributions, since in the CAPP_DYN model we keep track of this variable when we 
simulate the future employment history. The main limitation in using this variable is that it does not 
include  years spent  in  paid  work when the individual avoided paying social contributions  for 
various reasons, such as participation in the grey or black market. Moreover, the variable is top -
coded to the standard current requisite for retirement, which is 40 years. In order to check for its 
validity as a proxy, we compare it with a different It-Silc variable, where the respondents reported 
the number of years spent in paid work. In Graph 4 and Graph 5 we can observe that the relation 
between the mean logarithm monthly gross earnings and the years of social contributions is similar 
to the relation with respect to years spent in paid work, at least up to the top-coding for the former. 
                                                 
13 A common procedure is to take the natural logarithm of earnings in adjusting for skewedness of the data. However, 
the logarithm transformation is not innocuous. See appendix A for a discussion and an alternative set up. 11 | P a g e  
 
It is important to notice that Graph 5 shows a large dispersion after 40 years spent in paid job. 
Given that the estimated correlation between the two variables is quite high in the sample (0.8954), 
we prefer to use the years of social contribution, essentially because it is the variable that will keep 
track of the job history of each individual in the dynamic simulation. 
 
Graph 4 Mean of the monthly logarithm gross earnings, by years of social contributions and 
level of education, euro 2006 
 
 
We also added a vector of J regressors x to the basic model, as we expect them to have some 
effect on the earnings level: age and age squared; immigrant status; geographical area of residence; 
sector  of  employment;  part-time  or  full-time  job.  In  groups  of  non-graduated  workers  we  also 
included a dummy indicating whether or not the individual completed secondary education. For 
self-employed, we control for a binary variable assuming value one if they have atypical contracts. 
Lastly,  we  add  a  dummy  for  females  for  the  graduated  self-employed.  The  description  of  the 
variables is reported in Table 10 in Appendix B. The gain in adding these variables is the increased 
amount of log-earnings variance explained by our model, even if we lose the correspondence with 
the theoretical Mincer equation.  
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Graph 5 Mean of the monthly gross earnings, by years spent in paid work and level of 
education, euro 2006 
 
 
Furthermore, we added some interactions where required to improve the specification of the 
conditional  mean.  In  order  to  choose  which  to  include,  we  decided  to  proceed  by  adding 
interactions between the year of contributions on the one side and geographical and secondary 
education dummies on the other.
14 We did not include interactions with  age  in  order to  avoid 
picking up effects that are more likely to be related with cohort effects. The latter, as discussed in 
section 2, cannot be identifiable by using cross-sectional data. 
Lastly, the high correlation between age, years of contributions and their squares causes 
estimates of the associated coefficients to show high variation. We removed the squares of either 
the age or social contributions dummies when they turned out to be not significant at the 10% level. 
For six out of seven groups we retain the square of age but not that of years of social contribution, 
consistently  with  previous  works  using  Italian  administrative  data  for  the  private  sector  (see 
Brugiavini & Peracchi (2003, p. 92), Giarda, (2007, p. 70)).
15 
If we always add the interactions, several coefficients turn out to be estimated with poor 
precision. Selection of the final model is a non -trivial issue. One solution could be to include all 
                                                 
14  The  original  Mincer  model  predicts  that  ―log-earnings  experience  profiles  are  parallel  across  schooling  levels‖ 
(Heckman, Lochner, & Todd, 2003, p. 8). However, Heckman et al. (2003) strongly rejected this assumption with US 
data. 
15 Giarda (2007, p. 70) includes the logarithm of years of social contributions, but there is no specific reason to follow 
her choice. 13 | P a g e  
 
interactions in a first step and then exclude those which are not significant at, say, the 5% level. 
However, it is not clear how to proceed in removing non-significant coefficients. As discussed by 
Goldberger (1991, p. 258-261), when selection is driven by data, standard t-test statistics are not 
valid. The risk of ―data mining‖ (Lovell, 1983) is to select a few interactions that appear to be 
statistically significant only because we are using the wrong critical values.  Furthermore, it is not 
clear  whether  or  not  we  should  remove  regressors  that  were  suggested  by  theory,  such  as 
experience, or that appear to be unavoidable, like the dummy for part-time. This is particularly true 
when their coefficients turned out insignificant from the statistical point of view but not from the 
economic perspective. 
Therefore we proceed in a different way. We start with the basic set of regressors and test 
for correct specification using a RESET test (Ramsey, 1969), run by adding the squares of the fitted 
values in the OLS regression, and testing their significance with a robust F-test. If the model passes 
the test at the 5% level, we do not add any interaction. Otherwise, we first add the set of interactions 
previously discussed. We came up with the specifications displayed in Table 5 where all models 
have passed the RESET test at the 5% level. The group for non-graduated female employees passed 
the test with a p-value of only 0.0500, but the p-value improved to 0.0998 when we added the 
square  of  social  contribution,  whose  coefficient  is  not  significant  at  the  10%  level.  Other 
interactions turned out to be significant, in particular those among other dummies, such as private 
sector or immigrant. However, we chose not to add them, because we prefer to keep a parsimonious 
but possibly correctly specified model. Indeed, it is clear that adding interactions always increases 
the R
2, but it is well known that this statistics does not provide a good guidance for model choice. 
Anyway, we never observed any large increase in the explained variance when we included these 
additional regressors, while the RESET test result did not always improve.  
If we define the       vector of regressors as      (       
    ),          , the statistical 
model can be written as 
                
 (  |   )     
where   is the       vector of parameters.
16 The model is therefore estimated using OLS, assuming 
linearity between log earning and its determinants, in line with all previous models used in a DMM. 
We pursued other approaches which relax this assumption.  Poisson Maximum Likelihood model is 
discussed in the appendix.
17 OLS results are reported in Table 5.  
                                                 
16 We bottom-coded      to 5.7 euro and we top-coded it at 9.2 euro, respectively the 1
st and the 99
th percentile, in order 
to avoid outliers. 
17 One critique might be that we can estimate the regression only for individuals who are actually working, because we 
do not know the wage for those currently unemployed. Given that the labor market status of an individual is 14 | P a g e  
 
Geographical differences are highlighted by a positive North dummy coefficient, while the 
South dummy is usually negative. As discussed before, private sector employees tend to have lower 
gross earnings. Part-time workers show sensible lower earnings, even if the difference is lower 
among self-employed. The coefficient on the immigrant dummy is negative and quite large, as it 
might have been expected. Coefficients on age and years of social contributions are always positive, 
apart from the small and not significant coefficient for men, not graduated, self-employed. There 
seems to be decreasing returns on age or experience, as the quadratic term is generally negative. 
Among not-graduated employees, the interaction term between social contribution and secondary 
education is positive and significant, as well as the interaction with the North dummy, showing 
higher  returns  on  experience  for  these  groups.  Lastly,  the  atypical  dummy  is  negative  and 
significantly different from zero only among men, not graduated, self-employed.  
Results are in line with expectations and previous studies. However, one possible concern is 
that we still observe an increase in earnings with age even for individuals aged 50-64. Brugiavini & 
Peracchi  (2003,  p.  90-94),  using  administrative  panel  data  for  private  sector  non-agricultural 
employees between 1973 and 1997, argued that the annual earning profile is flatter after 50. We 
check whether the regression was able to smooth the steep increase in earnings in the last years of 
the active life that we observed in the descriptive analysis.
18 In Graph 6 the predicted age pattern for 
men seems slightly concave, and the steep though variable increase in years near to 65 seems to be 
smoothed with regression. For women we did not observe a similar pattern in actual values, and we 
observe an almost linear trend in predicted values ( Graph 7). Employees (Graph 9) exhibited the 
steepest increases around age 60, which are again smoothed by regressions . We observe a similar 
result for self-employed (Graph 9). Lastly, it should be added that, when Brugiavini & Peracchi 
(2003) used the annualized monthly earnings, ―defined as annual earnings divided by the fraction of 
months a person worked during the year‖ (idem, pg. 91), they also found that earnings increase both 
for men and for women. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
endogenously  determined  in  our  model,  we  might  need  to  use  a  selection  correction  in  estimating  earnings.  As 
Emmerson, Reed, & Shephard (2004, p. 19) state ―it would in theory be possible to estimate the entire model jointly via 
maximum.‖ However, this would require labor market transitions and wage regressions to be estimated on the same 
dataset. We decided not to follow this route for  the short length of It-Silc forced us to use the labor force survey (see 
Flisi and Morciano, 2011) in estimating conditional transition probabilities in the labor market. Furthermore, given the 
non-structural  nature  of  our  model,  we  would  need  a  highly  parameterized  model  in  order  to  allow  monte-carlo 
simulation. Lastly, reports from other dynamic microsimulation models do not currently mention any concern about this 
issue. See for example the French DESTINIE (Blanchet, Buffeteau, Crenner, & Le Minez, 2010, p. 12) and the model 
for the Italian Tuscany region MIRTODIN (Maitino & Sciclone, 2009). 
18 In order to further address this concern, we repeated the es timates in Table 5 excluding first men aged 60 or more, 
and then restricting the sample to men and women aged 20 to 54.  15 | P a g e  
 
Table 5 OLS estimates, dependent variable logarithm monthly gross earnings, euro 2006 























North  0.1006***  0.1187***  0.0651*  0.0595*  0.2425***  0.0646**  0.0442 
(0.023)  (0.027)  (0.039)  (0.033)  (0.057)  (0.032)  (0.050) 
South  -0.1458***  -0.0961***  -0.1686***  -0.0772**  0.0023  -0.2655***  -0.3025*** 
(0.027)  (0.034)  (0.046)  (0.038)  (0.070)  (0.036)  (0.059) 
Private  -0.0845***  -0.1619***  -0.0694*  -0.0625*       
(0.012)  (0.014)  (0.036)  (0.034)       
Part-time  -0.6440***  -0.5145***  -0.5826***  -0.5718***  -0.4604***  -0.2742***  -0.2830*** 
(0.034)  (0.015)  (0.147)  (0.040)  (0.080)  (0.078)  (0.054) 
Secondary  0.0507***  0.1402***        0.1926***  0.1990*** 
(0.019)  (0.025)        (0.026)  (0.043) 
Immigrant  -0.2228***  -0.2118***  -0.4556***  -0.3970***  -0.4060***  -0.0313  -0.2395** 
(0.020)  (0.032)  (0.074)  (0.081)  (0.139)  (0.079)  (0.110) 
Age  0.0336***  0.0147***  0.0736***  0.0493***  0.0247***  -0.0029  0.0340** 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.017) 
Age squared  -0.0004***  -0.0002***  -0.0006***  -0.0004***    0.0001  -0.0004** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Contributions  0.0120***  0.0154***  0.0024  0.0111***  0.0396***  0.0060**  0.0082** 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Contributions 
squared 
        -0.0009***     
        (0.000)     
Secondary*Contrib.  0.0086***  0.0079***           
(0.001)  (0.001)           
North*Contributions  -0.0032***  -0.0034**           
(0.001)  (0.001)           
South*Contributions  -0.0003  0.0012           
(0.001)  (0.002)           
Women          -0.1621***     
        (0.054)     
Atypical          -0.0002  -0.2127***  -0.1089 
        (0.062)  (0.077)  (0.070) 
Constant  6.7337***  6.9234***  6.0849***  6.4061***  6.5138***  7.3012***  6.4038*** 
(0.076)  (0.100)  (0.330)  (0.244)  (0.169)  (0.209)  (0.332) 
Observations  7478  5349  1005  1169  911  2627  1124 
R
2  0.334  0.427  0.293  0.349  0.265  0.112  0.119 
Adjusted R
2  0.333  0.426  0.287  0.344  0.258  0.109  0.111 
Res. sum of squares  1154  915  258  247  477  1136  510 
RESET (p-value)  0.155  0.171  0.259  0.213  0.529  0.434  0.458 
RESET (p-value)  0.6852  0.4375  0.5726  0.4482  0.5171  0.8156  0.6057 
Note: Standard errors robust for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Reference group: men 
(when both sexes are included), primary school, Italian citizen, working full-time, living in Central Italy, non-atypical 
worker, working in the public sector. The RESET test is conducted testing the joint significance of the square of fitted 
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Graph 6 Monthly gross earnings for male workers, actual and predicted mean values, 2006 
 
Note:  the  predicted  values      are  first  obtained  from  the  regression.  To  transform  them  in  log,  we  use  the 
transformation              ⁄ . 
 
Graph 7 Monthly gross earnings for female workers, actual and predicted mean values, 2006 
 
Note:  the  predicted  values      are  first  obtained  from  the  regression.  To  transform  them  in  log,  we  use  the 
transformation              ⁄ . 
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Graph 8 Monthly gross earnings for employees, actual and predicted mean values, 2006 
 
Note:  the  predicted  values      are  first  obtained  from  the  regression.  To  transform  them  in  log,  we  use  the 
transformation              ⁄ . 
 
Graph 9 Monthly gross earnings for self-employed, actual and predicted mean values, 2006 
 
Note:  the  predicted  values      are  first  obtained  from  the  regression.  To  transform  them  in  log,  we  use  the 
transformation              ⁄ . 
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5. Panel estimates 
We now estimate a similar model using the panel component of It-Silc. The main purpose of 
this exercise is to model the serial correlation in the earnings residuals, in order to allow for serial 
correlation due both  to  individual unobserved heterogeneity  and to  an  autoregressive transitory 
component.  In  this  way,  following  Pudney  (1992),  as  explained  in  section  6,  we  were  able  to 
forecast future residual components. 
Borella (2004) used data from the Bank of Italy Survey on Households’ Income and Wealth 
to argue that a satisfactory model for the earnings residuals should include an individual effect plus 
a first-order autoregressive component:
19 
                   
                       (1) 
                  ,        (    
 ), | |     
      (    
 ) 
where     is the       vector of regressors (including a constant) observed for individual i at 
time t. Actually, this is the model originally discussed in Lillard and Willis (1978). Baltagi and Li 
(1991)  proposed  a  different  and  simpler  estimation  procedure,  while  Baltagi  and  Wu  (1999) 
discussed the case of unequally spaced panels. It should be noted that, in order to recover consistent 
estimators for  ,  ,   
  and   
 , we are assuming strict exogeneity, so that at each period t the time-
varying error component is independent from the vector of covariates at all time periods.  
Assuming that the individual effects    are i.i.d. and independent from the regressors    , the 
model can be estimated using random effects. It may be argued that we should take into account the 
possibility that the individual effects are not independent of the exogenous regressors. However, 
this  is  not  suitable for the setting up of the dynamic model, for the two reasons  discussed by 
Emmerson, Reed and Shephard (2004, p. 33). First, each individual who enters paid employment or 
starts self-employment for the first time must be assigned an individual effect. However, fixed 
effect methods do not allow us to consistently estimate the variance of the fixed effect in order to 
predict it for these individuals. Secondly, fixed effect estimation does not allow for time-invariant 
characteristics, such as gender or education, which are important in explaining variation.  
The main problem in estimating a model on the panel is that we do not have the information 
on gross earnings, because Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) started providing gross 
earnings only from the 2007 cross-section. Since then, ISTAT has started to recover information on 
                                                 
19 Borella’s model allows for the possibility that the variance of the error changes with age. We neglect this problem for 
the moment, assuming as in Lillard and Willis (1978, p. 6) that earnings in the initial condition display a shock      
    √(      ) ⁄ ,, so that they can be treated as stationary. 19 | P a g e  
 
gross-earnings also with respect to previous waves, as they come from one-to-one matching with 
administrative  archives.  However,  the  process  is  not  yet  concluded,  and  therefore  we  are  not 
currently able to exploit the longitudinal data to analyse the gross earnings. We nevertheless carry 
out the estimation in order to provide some evidence on the autocorrelation of the residuals in net-
earnings, assuming that this can approximately describe the covariance structure in gross-earnings. 
New waves available as from next year onward will enable us promptly to improve the model. 
With this caveat in mind, we estimate this model on the first four rotational panels of It-Silc: 
2004-2007, 2005-2008, 2006-2008, 2007-2008.
20 In order to make it comparable with CAPP_DYN 
initial population, we apply to each year the corrections of the sample that we described in  Ciani et 
al (2011). Given the short length of the panel, we chose to remove observations where we observe a 
difference between the earnings in two subsequent waves larger in  absolute value than the 95
th 
percentile of the differences observed in all the years. This operation is conducted separately for the 
seven groups, so that the threshold varies from 953 euro per month for women, not graduated, 
employees, to 3835 per month for graduated self-employed. 
In  panel  estimates  it  is  not  possible  to  include  some  variables  used  in  the  previous 
paragraph. For privacy reasons, we cannot match cross-sectional observations with longitudinal 
records. However, the latter does not include all variables provided with the Italian version of SILC. 
First  of  all,  this  means  we  cannot  control  directly  for  the  private/public  sector,  because  the 
European  variables  do  not  exactly  correspond  to  the  variable  that  we  use  in  the  Italian  cross-
section.
21  Secondly, we do not know whether the self -employed individual is working with an 
atypical contract. Thirdly, the information on years of social contribution is not available, hence we 
use the variable reporting the number of years spent in paid work, top -coded to 40.  Lastly, the 
current Istat release of 2005 -2008, 2006-2008, 2007-2008 panels does not contain the variable 
―pb220a: Citizenship‖ which is needed to identify the immigrant workers. 
Some  descriptive  statistics  are  reported  in  Table  12  and  Table  14.  We  do  not  observe 
appreciable differences in covariates means. However, Table 13 highlights the presence of some 
differences that are significantly different from zero in the statistical sense. The most significant are 
those arising in the variables contributions. This is essentially due to the fact that, in the panel, this 
                                                 
20 Estimates are carried out using  the Stata
TM command xtregar,  which follows Baltagi and Wu (1999). The four 
rotational panels are pooled in one single unbalanced panel. In order to adjust for inflation,  we transform nominal 
values for earnings to express them in 2006 prices. For each year we use a coefficient equal to the average Italian 
consumer price index NIC (including tobacco) in that year divided by the average index in 2006. NIC time series are 
provided by Istat, and are available at http://www.istat.it/prezzi/precon/dati/ (last access: 18/04/2011). After adjusting 
for  inflation,  we  bottom-coded         to  5.16  euro  and  top-coded  it  at 8.73  euro,  respectively  the  1
st  and  the  99
th 
percentile, in order to avoid outliers. 
21 This problem is exacerbated by the absence of the variable  pl110 in the current releases of the IT-SILC longitudinal 
dataset. 20 | P a g e  
 
variable  is  measured  as  the  number  of  years  spent  in  paid  work,  and  therefore  it  has  to  be 
understood as a proxy for the regressors used in cross-section estimates. The difference between the 
mean in the two samples is nevertheless quite small for employees, whereas it is approximately two 
years for the self-employed. With respect to individual categories, it seems that those displaying 
larger differences are the self-employed. In these groups we find sensible differences for age, which 
might be due to the retirement of older cohorts of individuals with lower education. In a nutshell, 
differences are small overall and might be explained by the fact the panel covers a period of three 
years before the cross-section from which the initial population was drawn. 
Estimates are reported in Table 6. Note that the results are not directly comparable with 
Table 5, because in the set of regressors we include variables that are missing (private, atypical). 
Moreover, contributions is proxied by years spent in paid work, and we observe different estimates 
with respect to Table 5. The dummy north is generally smaller with respect to OLS, while south, 
secondary and female are similar. The coefficient on age and age squared is larger for all groups of 
employees.  However,  it  is  likely  to  include  some  of  the  effect  of  contributions,  because  the 
coefficient on its proxy years spent in paid work is smaller than what we observe for contributions 
in the cross-section. Among self-employed, the largest difference is observed for not-graduated 
men, because we find coefficients on age and age squared, which are respectively positive and 
negative.  
The most significant finding is that the dummy for part-time exhibits smaller coefficients in 
all groups, in particular among employees. If we interpret it in terms of elasticities, the coefficient 
seems indeed quite small from the economic perspective. One possible reason is that the variable 
part-time does not satisfy the strict exogeneity restriction. Indeed, it should be recalled that, under 
the random effects  assumptions previously stated, pooled OLS would be not efficient, but still 
consistent. Moreover, pooled OLS would still be consistent without strict exogeneity. We checked 
what happens for the employees group running pooled OLS, and we found estimated coefficients 
for part-time that are appreciably larger. Therefore we run a test for strict exogeneity proposed by 
Wooldridge (2002, p. 285), where we essentially test the significance of a lead of part-time as an 
additional regressor in random effects estimates. We fail to reject the null of its coefficient being 
equal to zero at the 1% level in all groups of employees. This finding suggests that the Random 
Effects panel estimates, although generally preferable, should be treated with caution, because strict 
exogeneity might be violated in modelling the mean of log-earnings. 
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Table 6 Panel estimates, dependent variable logarithm monthly net earnings, euro 2006 























North  0.0625***  0.0804***  0.0087  0.0555**  0.1049**  0.0535**  0.0532 
(0.014)  (0.016)  (0.028)  (0.023)  (0.049)  (0.023)  (0.039) 
South  -0.1137***  -0.1029***  -0.1404***  -0.0393  -0.0543  -0.2483***  -0.2949*** 
(0.015)  (0.019)  (0.031)  (0.026)  (0.056)  (0.026)  (0.047) 
Part-time  -0.2892***  -0.2823***  -0.1701***  -0.2361***  -0.3922***  -0.1936***  -0.1835*** 
(0.010)  (0.007)  (0.032)  (0.017)  (0.042)  (0.034)  (0.032) 
Secondary  0.0692***  0.1634***        0.1164***  0.1196*** 
(0.010)  (0.013)        (0.017)  (0.032) 
Age  0.0504***  0.0270***  0.0890***  0.0368***  0.0162***  0.0561***  0.0190 
(0.002)  (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.014) 
Age squared  -0.0005***  -0.0003***  -0.0008***  -0.0002**    -0.0006***  -0.0002 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Years spent in paid 
work 
0.0002  0.0016**  0.0002  0.0001  0.0115*  0.0014  0.0028 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Years spent in paid 
work squared 
        -0.0003**     
        (0.000)     
Secondary*Years 
spent in paid work 
0.0033***  0.0034***           
(0.000)  (0.001)           
North*Years  spent 
in paid work 
-0.0009  -0.0012           
(0.001)  (0.001)           
South*Years  spent 
in paid work 
0.0006  0.0019**           
(0.001)  (0.001)           
Women          -0.1560***     
        (0.044)     
Year==2004  0.0166***  0.0212***  0.0169  0.0094  0.0031  0.0224  0.0186 
  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.043)  (0.019)  (0.032) 
Year==2005  0.0036  -0.0068  0.0285*  0.0063  0.0261  0.0341*  -0.0053 
  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.043)  (0.019)  (0.033) 
Year==2006  -0.0010  -0.0074  0.0594***  0.0353**  0.0711  0.0354*  -0.0239 
  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.043)  (0.019)  (0.034) 
Year==2007  -0.0153**  -0.0151*  0.0212  -0.0044  0.0660  0.0612***  0.0178 
  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.047)  (0.021)  (0.037) 
Constant  6.0714***  6.2791***  5.4221***  6.2621***  6.7279***  5.9161***  6.4171*** 
(0.044)  (0.060)  (0.181)  (0.160)  (0.123)  (0.146)  (0.281) 
Observations  21583  15335  2701  3286  1881  7317  2698 
ζμ  0.240  0.242  0.317  0.285  0.453  0.399  0.427 
ζξ  0.185  0.222  0.194  0.213  0.410  0.369  0.396 







ξ  0.092  0.108  0.138  0.127  0.373  0.295  0.339 
RESET (p-value)  0.2508  0.6416  0.7302  0.3768  0.0047  0.231  0.4233 
Note: Standard errors robust for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Reference group: men 
(when both sexes are included), primary school, working full-time, living in Central Italy. The RESET test is conducted 
testing the joint significance of the square of fitted values, using an heteroskedasticity robust F test. 
 
 
6. Simulation of the earnings profile in the dynamic model 
Once a position within the labour force is simulated, the projections of individual annual 
earning in CAPP_DYN are obtained as follows. Estimates displayed in Table 5 or panel estimates 
presented in Table 6 are used to predict the deterministic component of the individual earnings in 
every year of the simulation, multiplying the monthly earnings by 12.
22 However individual income 
                                                 
22 We assume that all the sample members, for whom an employment status is predicted in time t + s, will be in work 
for the entire year (12 months) without experiencing unemployment spells within the simulated year.  22 | P a g e  
 
differs because of the presence of unobserved individual effect and a yearly component which can 
be considered as the increase in productivity distributed to all workers in each simulation period. 
Unobserved individual effects are modelled using the procedure proposed in Pudney (1992). 
In  paragraph  4  we  decomposed  the  residual       of  the  logarithm  monthly  earnings  into  two 
components: an individual specific effect    and an orthogonal error term    , independent among 
themselves and mean independent with respect to the covariates      In order to simulate values for 
future earnings, we further assume that the errors are normally distributed: 
                       (1) 
                  ,      (    
 ), | |     
    (    
 ) 
Both components are assumed to have zero mean and variance   
  and   
   respectively. It 
should also be noted that the autoregressive component implies that 
   (         |    )       
       (2) 
where       (                 ) .  It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  in  the  population,  we  can 
identify  the  mean  of  individual’s  log-earnings      in  period  s  conditional  on  log-earnings  at  a 
different period t,     , and on the set of covariates at both time periods      and    . Assuming 
normality  of  both  components  of  the  error,  and  independence  among  them,  the  conditional 
expectation of    ,is: 
 (   |            )           (   )(          )(3)    
 
The first term      can be interpreted as the deterministic part computed using coefficients 
in Table 6 or alternatively using coefficients obtained from the cross-sectional models (Table 5) by 
the vector of updated characteristic     whereas the second term is the product between the term 
(          ) , which is equal to the composite error term     and a weighting factor 
 (   )  
  
   |   |  
 
  
    
        (4) 
The model implies that we can forecast the conditional mean of log-earnings in any future 
period s of the microsimulation model using the covariates     in that period, the residuals (     
     ̂) estimated for the worker in the initial population (denoted with subscript 0), and the estimates 
for   (   ). Intuitively, when we predict log-earning in period s we take into account the individual 
residual,  as estimated in  period  t, but  we assign to  it a  weight  that  declines  with  the distance 
between t and s. 23 | P a g e  
 
A practical problem is that parameters in eq (4) can be estimated only using panel data,  
whereas the deterministic component of the earning equation can be obtained using a cross-section, 
as we do in CAPP_DYN. From our panel estimates we found a value of ρ ranging from 0.123 to 
0.346;  ζμ  ranging  from  0.240  to  0.427  and  ζξ  ranging  from  0.185  to  0.410.  It  is  a  not 
straightforward task to assess to which extend these values are reliable or not. Comparable results 
can be found in Ramos (2003), who found for the UK (period 1991 to 2002) parameters quite 
similar to those founded by Lillard and Willis (1978) using the American PSID panel.  
The most detailed and reliable analysis for Italy has been carried out by Borella (2004) and 
Borella  and  Coda-Moscarola  (2009).  We  focus  on  the  latter  because  the  model  is  directly 
comparable to our result. From Table 7 and Table 8 we note that, using the panel component of  It-
SILC, we found slightly higher values for the variance of the residuals, in particular for the standard 
deviation of the time varying error component  . Interestingly, in our results for self-employed the 
correlation term ρ is quite consistent with the result from Borella and Coda-Moscarola (2009), 
whereas it seems to be underestimated in our case for employees. This is possibly due to the short 
length of the IT-SILC panel, as the fraction of individuals observed for the maximum number of 
four  years is still quite limited.
23 Moreover, the uses of different samples representative of the 
Italian population in different points in time, and with different definition of earnings and set of 
observable socio-economic characteristics, may explain a not negligible part of the differences in 
the estimates. 
 


























ζμ  0.240  0.242  0.317  0.285  0.453  0.399  0.427 





ε  0.627  0.543  0.728  0.642  0.550  0.539  0.538 
ρ  0.322  0.346  0.249  0.282  0.123  0.171  0.237 














                                                 
23 One solution would be to implement a more robust estimator, such as the minimum distance one proposed by Borella 
(2004). However, it is not worth developing the estimates in that direction until the IT-SILC panel has reached a 
sufficient size. 24 | P a g e  
 
Table 8 Results in Borella and Coda Moscarola (2009), gross log earnings. 
  Males  Females 
  Blue collar  White collar  Self-employed  Blue collar  White collar  Self-employed 
ζμ  0.242  0.335  0.263  0.332  0.360  0.229 





ε  0.750  0.870  0.407  0.748  0.799  0.353 
ρ  0.432  0.529  0.165  0.419  0.440  0.070 





ξ da panel  0.078  0.129  0.170  0.147  0.162  0.148 
Source: Borella & Coda Moscarola (2009, p. 31). Notation is adapted to the present paper. 
Note: ζξ is derived using the relation   
      
  (      ) ⁄   (Lillard & Willis, 1978, p. 989) 
 
Because of the uncertainty  regarding these values, we decided to build an earning module 
which is fully flexible in the choice of these parameters. Essentially, it should be noted that, in order 
to predict future earnings using the procedure proposed by Pudney (1992), we can get an estimate 
for  (   ) using values for   ̂,   ̂ 
  and   ̂ 
  obtained from other sources. In this way we can also carry 
out sensitivity analysis using estimates coming from different sources. 
A further problem in generating stochastically earnings for the simulated period is that the 
term (          ), which is equal to the composite error term    , is unavailable for those who the 
information on earning is not available at the time of the interview (in work and not respondent; 
temporarily not in work). Assuming normality we compute this term extracting a random number 
from a normally distributed function with mean zero and variance (  
      
 ). 
Finally,     is multiplied by a factor (      ) allowing the individual earning in s to be 
linked to the medium-long term productivity growth, calibrated through the ―scenario‖ block. Again 
there is one point which needs to be made clear: the demographic evolution and the increase in the 
stock of human capital in the coming decades increase the average earning level, since age and 
education have a positive effect on average labour earnings
24. However, in this model, endogenous 
growth is smaller than the growth forecasts according to RGS, since it d oes not allow for the 
expected increase in productivity. In order to avoid over/under-estimations of earnings growth rates 
for the coming decades, the following procedure is adopted: every year, a pro-quota growth factor τ 
is added to the endogenous growth due to the socio-demographic evolution. This factor is equal to 
the difference between  the exogenous earning  growth fixed in  the  ―scenario‖ and the earnings 
growth estimated by the model. 
The term    is given by:   
                                                 
24 Other factors could have a negative effect, for instance the increase of female participation in the labour market, the 
increase of immigrants and the diffusion of part-time contracts. 25 | P a g e  
 
          (
 (  )
 (    )    )        (4) 
where m is exogenously determined in the ―scenario‖
25, while  (  )  (    ) ⁄  describes the 
endogenous growth rate generated by the model. 
 
Appendix A: A non-linear model for earnings 
Suppose that theory predicts a non-linear relation between earnings, experience and socio-
demographic variables. In particular, let us restrict the attention to exponential models such as: 
       (    ) 
In this case we can again assume that the relation holds on average, adding an error term ηi  
for each individual i=1,…,n: 
        (    )   
 (  |   )     
As discussed by Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006), the choice of using the logarithm of y is 
far from being innocuous. In order to have consistent estimators for the parameters in the linear 
equation: 
                   
we need  (     |   )    . But this is not necessarily true given the previous assumption on ηi, 
because: 
 (     |   )       (  |   )     
An alternative proposed by  Santos Silva & Tenreyro  (2006) is to use the independence 
condition between the error term and the vector of regressors      (     
    ): 
 [(        (    ))  ]     
whose sample analogue is 
 
 
∑[        (     ̂)]      
 
   
 
This  condition is  equivalent  to  that of the Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator, that 
could be implemented in Stata
TM using the command poisson.  
Results  are  reported  in  Table  9.  It  is  reassuring  to  observe  that  there  are  no  sensible 
variations with respect to Table 5. One of the main differences is that the dummy for the private 
sector is generally not significant and smaller in magnitude. The dummy for immigrants is now 
slightly larger, even if differences with OLS are smaller than twice the standard errors of Poisson 
                                                 
25 RGS projects yearly-increases in productivity of 1.1% until 2020; 1.6% in the period 2021-2030; 1.8% in the period 
2031-2040 and 1.7% in the period 2041-2050 (RGS 2009). 26 | P a g e  
 
estimates. We observe some changes in sign for the square of contributions and age, but always 
when the coefficient turns out to be not significantly different from zero at the 10% level. The 
RESET test now fails to reject the null at the 5% level for men, not graduated, self-employed. 
Overall, these results do not seem to suggest any significant problem in estimating the logarithmic 
specification with OLS. 
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Table 9 Poisson estimates, dependent variable monthly gross earnings, euro 2006 























North  0.0993***  0.1270***  0.1013**  0.0564  0.2677***  0.1076*  0.0351 
  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.049)  (0.042)  (0.089)  (0.058)  (0.076) 
South  -0.1149***  -0.0612  -0.1941***  -0.0527  0.0856  -0.2657***  -0.3559*** 
  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.052)  (0.047)  (0.104)  (0.054)  (0.087) 
Private  -0.0036  -0.0967***  0.0014  -0.0021       
  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.051)  (0.042)       
Part-time  -0.5996***  -0.4949***  -0.4155**  -0.6160***  -0.4726***  0.2351  -0.2834*** 
  (0.041)  (0.019)  (0.197)  (0.043)  (0.103)  (0.434)  (0.069) 
Secondary  0.0542**  0.1793***        0.3319***  0.1818** 
  (0.026)  (0.035)        (0.061)  (0.071) 
Immigrant  -0.2595***  -0.1162  -0.5917***  -0.4284***  -0.4682***  -0.0968  -0.3385*** 
  (0.025)  (0.084)  (0.089)  (0.089)  (0.159)  (0.102)  (0.101) 
Age  0.0210***  0.0064  0.0749***  0.0623***  0.0290***  -0.0520**  0.0401* 
  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.024)  (0.014)  (0.008)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Age squared  -0.0002**  -0.0001  -0.0006**  -0.0006***    0.0008***  -0.0004 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Contributions  0.0094***  0.0170***  0.0046  0.0084**  0.0343***  0.0063  0.0072 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.013)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
Contributions 
squared 
        -0.0006*     
        (0.000)     
Secondary*Con
tributions 
0.0099***  0.0065***           
  (0.001)  (0.002)           
North*Contribu
tions 
-0.0035*  -0.0044*           
  (0.002)  (0.003)           
South*Contribu
tions 
-0.0026  -0.0001           
  (0.002)  (0.003)           
Women          -0.1039     
          (0.075)     
Atypical          -0.0483  -0.2375  -0.1214 
          (0.111)  (0.174)  (0.089) 
Constant  6.9161***  7.0346***  6.0899***  6.2130***  6.6102***  8.2169***  6.4498*** 
  (0.110)  (0.177)  (0.547)  (0.290)  (0.305)  (0.374)  (0.432) 
Observations  7478  5349  1005  1169  911  2627  1124 
RESET  (p-
value) 
0.0789  0.8477  0.2149  0.3525  0.4073  0.0332  0.2492 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Reference group: men (when both sex are 
included), primary school, Italian citizen, working full-time, living in the Centre Italy, non-atypical worker, working in 
the public sector. The RESET test is conducted testing the joint significance of the square of fitted values. 
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Appendix B: Additional results and tables 
 
Table 10 Variables codebook 
Variable  Description 
Women 
North 
=1 if the individual is a women 
=1 if the individual lives in North Italy 
South  =1 if the individual lives in South Italy (including Sardinia and Sicilia) 
Immigrant  =1 if the individual does not have Italian citizenship 
Private  =1 for the private sector 
Atypical  =1 if the individual has an atypical contract. Atypical refers to workers with particular contracts that are 
classified  under  self-employment,  in  particular  those  named  ―Collaborazione  coordinata  e 
continuativa‖ 
Part-time  =1 if the individual has a part-time job 
Secondary  =1 if the individual has completed the secondary level of education (high school) 
Age  Age of the individual, in years 
Contribution  Years of social contributions paid up to the current year 
 
Table  11  Sample  means  of  explanatory  variables,  by  regression  group ,  sample 
corresponding to the initial population 
Group  Women  Nord  South  Immi- 
grant  Private  Atypical  Part-
time 
Secon-
dary  Age  Contri-
butions 
Men,  not 
graduated, 
employees 
0.0%  47.5%  29.0%  5.5%  80.0%  0.0%  3.7%  54.0%  40.5  18.3 
Men,  graduated, 
employees 
0.0%  48.5%  26.2%  3.0%  50.8%  0.0%  2.5%  0.0%  43.1  16.9 
Women,  not 
graduated, 
employees 




100.0%  45.8%  27.0%  3.8%  38.2%  0.0%  13.8%  0.0%  40.3  14.1 
Graduated,  self-
employed 
41.2%  48.1%  26.0%  3.3%  94.0%  19.2%  12.5%  0.0%  40.2  12.8 
Men,  not 
graduated,  self-
employed 
0.0%  47.0%  28.2%  2.9%  99.5%  3.5%  3.8%  56.1%  42.6  19.5 
Women,  not 
graduated,  self-
employed 
100.0%  51.4%  23.7%  3.3%  98.5%  10.3%  18.1%  58.0%  41.2  16.5 
Total  40.8%  49.4%  26.0%  4.7%  78.4%  1.9%  11.0%  49.2%  40.7  17.1 
 
Table 12 Sample means of explanatory variables, by regression group, longitudinal sample 
Group  Women  North  South  Part-time  Secon-
dary  Age  Contri-
butions 
Men, not graduated, employees  0.0%  47.4%  28.9%  3.7%  53.0%  40.4  18.9 
Men, graduated, employees  0.0%  48.5%  27.5%  3.2%  0.0%  42.6  16.0 
Women, not graduated, employees  100.0%  54.7%  20.0%  24.5%  65.1%  39.8  16.3 
Women, graduated, employees  100.0%  48.1%  25.7%  13.5%  0.0%  40.3  13.8 
Graduated, self-employed  37.9%  48.7%  25.7%  12.7%  0.0%  42.0  14.9 
Men, not graduated, self-employed  0.0%  49.0%  26.5%  3.6%  54.4%  43.4  21.0 
Women, not graduated, self-employed  100.0%  51.1%  22.4%  16.1%  55.3%  42.5  18.6 
Total  40.16%  49.94%  25.38%  10.92%  48.53%  40.9  17.9 
Note: the estimates refer to the sample of those observed for at least one wave. 
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Table 13 P-values from the t-test of equal means in the panel and in the cross-section (initial 
population) 
Group  Women  North  South  Part-time  Secondary  Age 
Contri-butions / 
Years spent in 
paid work 
Men,  not  graduated, 
employees  -  0.876  0.811  0.929  0.147  0.436  0.000 
Men,  graduated, 
employees  -  0.983  0.419  0.245    0.202  0.030 
Women,  not  graduated, 
employees  -  0.517  0.191  0.598  0.394  0.913  0.000 
Women,  graduated, 
employees  -  0.170  0.358  0.820  -  0.947  0.389 
Graduated, self-employed  0.086  0.733  0.876  0.875  -  0.000  0.000 
Men,  not  graduated,  self-
employed  -  0.078  0.097  0.520  0.109  0.000  0.000 
Women,  not  graduated, 
self-employed  -  0.863  0.373  0.140  0.109  0.000  0.000 
Total  0.130  0.220  0.103  0.689  0.087  0.011  0.000 
Note: the null hypothesis of the test is that the mean of the variable is equal in the two samples, against the alternative 
that it is different. The test is carried out using the Stata
TM command ttest, allowing for unequal variance in the two 
samples. Estimates for the standard error should take into account that some individuals belongs to both the panel and 
the cross-section. However, privacy rules in Eu-Silc do not allow us to find them in the sample. Therefore this table 
ignores this issue. 
 
Table 14 Pattern for individuals included in the panel (employees) 
Men, not graduated, 
employees 
Women, not graduated, 
employees  Men, graduated, employees  Women, graduated, 
employees 
Pattern  Perc.  Obs.  Pattern  Perc.  Obs.  Pattern  Perc.  Obs.  Pattern  Perc.  Obs. 
...11  18.4%  1909  ...11  17.8%  261  ...11  17.6%  1377  ...11  18.0%  313 
..111  13.4%  1389  ..111  12.1%  177  ..111  12.8%  1003  ..111  14.2%  246 
1111.  11.8%  1219  1111.  10.4%  153  1111.  10.9%  848  .1111  9.5%  164 
.1111  11.5%  1187  .1111  9.4%  138  .1111  9.8%  767  1111.  9.5%  164 
...1.  6.4%  663  ...1.  8.4%  123  ...1.  7.2%  565  ...1.  8.9%  154 
.1...  4.9%  502  ....1  7.4%  109  ....1  5.5%  429  ....1  7.7%  134 
1....  4.8%  500  ..1..  5.6%  82  ..1..  5.2%  409  ..1..  5.0%  87 
..1..  4.8%  494  .1...  5.4%  79  .1...  5.2%  404  .1...  5.0%  86 
....1  4.4%  458  ..11.  5.1%  75  1....  5.1%  398  ..11.  4.8%  83 
..11.  4.3%  449  .111.  4.0%  59  ..11.  4.8%  378  .111.  3.4%  59 
.111.  3.5%  360  1....  3.5%  52  .111.  3.5%  276  1....  3.4%  59 
.11..  2.9%  299  .11..  2.5%  37  .11..  3.3%  255  .11..  2.7%  46 
11...  2.5%  258  111..  2.2%  32  11...  2.4%  190  11...  2.0%  35 
111..  2.4%  245  11...  1.8%  27  111..  2.3%  182  111..  1.4%  24 
..1.1  1.0%  108  ..1.1  1.0%  14  ..1.1  1.1%  87  ..1.1  1.3%  22 
.1.11  0.7%  67  .11.1  1.0%  14  .11.1  0.6%  47  .1.1.  0.8%  14 
.11.1  0.6%  60  11.1.  0.6%  9  .1.11  0.6%  45  1.11.  0.6%  11 
11.1.  0.5%  49  1.1..  0.5%  7  1.11.  0.6%  43  .1.11  0.5%  9 
1.11.  0.5%  47  1.11.  0.5%  7  11.1.  0.5%  37  .11.1  0.5%  9 
.1.1.  0.4%  37  .1.11  0.4%  6  .1.1.  0.4%  30  1..1.  0.3%  5 
.1..1  0.2%  20  .1.1.  0.3%  4  1.1..  0.2%  16  .1..1  0.2%  4 
1.1..  0.2%  20  .1..1  0.1%  2  .1..1  0.2%  14  1.1..  0.2%  4 
1..1.  0.2%  17  1..1.  0.1%  1  1..1.  0.2%  13  11.1.  0.2%  4 
All  100.0%  10357  All  100.0%  1468  All  100.0%  5871  All  100.0%  1736 
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Table 15 Pattern for individuals included in the panel (self-employed) 
Graduated, self-employed  Men, not graduated, self-employed  Women, not graduated, self-employed 
Pattern  Perc.  Obs.  Pattern  Perc.  Obs.  Pattern  Perc.  Obs. 
...11  17.5%  236  ...11  17.2%  698  ...11  15.2%  284 
...1.  12.8%  173  ..111  12.2%  496  ...1.  12.2%  227 
..111  9.7%  131  ...1.  10.0%  408  ..111  8.5%  159 
....1  9.6%  129  .1111  9.8%  399  .1...  7.9%  147 
.1...  7.2%  97  1111.  9.8%  398  1111.  7.9%  147 
1111.  7.1%  96  ..1..  5.8%  236  ..1..  7.8%  146 
.1111  6.7%  90  ....1  5.6%  228  .1111  6.8%  127 
..11.  6.2%  84  .1...  4.9%  197  1....  6.8%  127 
..1..  5.6%  75  ..11.  4.7%  190  ....1  6.0%  111 
1....  4.3%  58  1....  4.4%  177  .111.  3.8%  71 
.111.  3.2%  43  .111.  3.3%  135  ..11.  3.7%  69 
11...  2.3%  31  .11..  2.7%  111  .11..  2.6%  49 
111..  1.7%  23  11...  2.5%  102  11...  2.6%  49 
.11..  1.6%  22  111..  1.8%  72  ..1.1  1.8%  34 
..1.1  1.0%  14  ..1.1  1.0%  41  111..  1.8%  33 
.1.1.  0.8%  11  .1.11  0.8%  32  .1.1.  1.0%  18 
.11.1  0.7%  9  .11.1  0.8%  31  .1.11  0.8%  15 
1.11.  0.7%  9  1.11.  0.8%  31  11.1.  0.8%  15 
.1.11  0.4%  5  11.1.  0.6%  23  1.1..  0.6%  12 
11.1.  0.4%  5  .1.1.  0.5%  21  .11.1  0.6%  11 
.1..1  0.3%  4  1.1..  0.4%  16  .1..1  0.4%  8 
1..1.  0.2%  3  .1..1  0.4%  15  1..1.  0.2%  3 
1.1..  0.2%  3  1..1.  0.2%  6  1.11.  0.1%  2 
All  100.0%  1351  All  100.0%  4063  All  100.0%  1864 
 
Graph 10 Median annual net earnings, by age and sex, euro 2006, longitudinal sample 
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Graph 11 Median annual net earnings, by age and schooling, euro 2006, longitudinal sample 
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